Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 masterدانشیار گروه فقه و حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران
2 دانشجوی دکتری فقه و مبانی حقوق، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران.
Abstract
In the hadiths and jurisprudential texts concerning the prohibition of bribery, an exception, i.e permissibility, is mentioned regarding the case of attaining one’s rightful claim. The question arises whether this permissibility should be considered a secondary ruling, or whether a distinction must be made between just and unjust governments, such that the ruling differs according to the type of government in question. Furthermore, how can this exception to the prohibition of bribery be applied in light of the doctrine of individualism in society?
In this article, through a descriptive-analytical method with an ijtihād-based approach, the following results were obtained: it may be argued that in just governments, the primary ruling on bribery for attaining one’s right is prohibition, while the secondary ruling—under special circumstances of hardship or severe harm, such as threats to life, property, honor, or dignity—is permissibility; although, in any case, receiving a bribe remains prohibited. In contrast, in unjust governments, the primary ruling is permissibility, while the secondary ruling, in cases involving serious harm to life, property, or reputation, is prohibition.
Moreover, based on the doctrine of individualism in society, the primary prohibition of bribery in just governments safeguards collective interests. However, in unjust governments, where the very foundation of governance is oppression, the collective interest is not genuinely protected; hence, prioritizing individual interest is permissible. Yet, under conditions such as fear of serious harm, the secondary ruling becomes prohibition. Additionally, if bribery in unjust governments leads to greater corruption, disruption of order, and abandonment of justice, the permissibility is revoked.
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